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Direct incentives and punishments are the most common instruments 
to fight tax evasion. The theoretical literature disregarded indirect 
schemes, such as itemised deductions, in which an agent has an interest 
in that other agents declare their revenue. Itemised deductions provide 
an incentive for consumers to declare their purchases, and this forces 
sellers to do the same. I show that, for any level of taxation, it is possible 
to increase tax proceeds by choosing the proper level of itemised 
deduction: the cost for the government on the consumers' side is more 
than compensated by the extra proceeds on the sellers' side. 
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  3\When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less
on the same amount of income" (Plato (nd))
1 Introduction
For most countries tax evasion is a major issue and tax proceeds are strongly af-
fected. By its nature, it is hard to estimate tax evasion. Franzoni (1999) estimates
that the US federal tax gap1 is about 17%. ? proposes an updated and detailed
description of tax compliance in the United States. In the 80's, the black eco-
nomy in western countries represented 5% to 15% of GDP (Cowell (1985)). More
recently, McKay (1998) and Schneider (2005) estimated that the black economy
roughly ranges from 6% (Switzerland) to 27% (Italy) of GDP.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and (1991) are amongst the most well known
works on tax compliance. Many surveys are available of the recent literature on
tax avoidance and/or evasion:2 among the most complete, Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) focus on tax avoidance and it is more theory oriented while Andreoni, Erard,
and Feinstein (1998) concentrate more on empirical works.
A politician may want to reduce evasion i) to increase tax proceeds, ii) to
promote the country's image on an international ground, iii) because of equa-
lity/fairness concerns, or iv) for legality reasons: (tax evasion is illegal). Note also
that black money is more likely to nance other illegal activities (Fortin, Lacroix,
and Montmarquette (2000)): by reducing evasion, the government reduces funds
spent on illicit activities. Note that part of the literature considers that, under
some conditions, tax evasion can be welfare improving. For an analysis of the
arguments for and against ghting tax evasion and its welfare consequences, see
Davidson, Martin, and Wilson (2007) and section 7 of Cowell (1985).3
The literature on tax evasion is mainly devoted to income taxation.4 Most of
the analysis of tax evasion concentrates on how evasion can be deterred through
detection and sanctions (Franzoni (1999)); rational consumers decide whether to
evade or not on a \cost-benet" analysis.5 The legislator disposes of a wide set of
1Tax gap, according to the United States Department of Treasury, measures the extent to
which taxpayers do not le their tax returns and pay the correct tax on time.
2Tax evasion consists of not declaring some earnings that, by law, an agent is supposed to
declare. Tax avoidance consists of abusing, or using the lack of detail in some laws, to reduce
the tax burden.
3Amongst the most common arguments: i)it is generally expensive to reduce evasion, ii)
taxes are distortive, the (second-best) tax scheme under information asymmetries may distort
sectors dierently, and evasion may have a counterbalancing eect, and iii) if evasion is inversely
correlated with income, tax evasion has redistributive eects.
4Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Marelli (1984) are notable exceptions.
5Evasion may also derive from the willingness to hide illegal activities: even with a 0% tax rate,
the underground economy would still represent about 4% of GDP, because of illegal activities
and agents willing to avoid regulation laws (McKay (1998)).
1instruments to ght tax evasion: direct incentives not to evade (e.g., decreasing tax
rates) and increasing the cost of evading (through higher nes or by using more
sophisticated audit systems) can be eective. Nonetheless, the cost of auditing
and agents' limited liability strongly limit the legislator's policy space.
I focus here on an indirect mechanism: itemised deductions. In many OECD
countries, deductions are not a widely used policy instrument: in Italy and Spain
allowed deductions represent no more than 5% of taxable income, in the UK and
Ireland up to 9%, and in all the OECD countries, itemised deductions are below
15% (OECD (1990)).6
I show that sellers' tax evasion decreases if consumers have incentives to declare
purchases, as this forces sellers to declare their revenue. I consider a market with
a consumption good available both legally and on the black market(for example,
cigarettes and tobacco, or pirated versions of music and software). Both consu-
mers' income and prots on the legal market are taxed at some, possibly dierent,
exogenous tax rates (possibly optimally chosen). Itemised deductions allow consu-
mers to reduce their tax base by declaring their purchases,7 this force sellers to
declare their earnings too.8
My model shows that partial deductibility of expenditures is sucient enough
of an incentive for the consumers to declare their purchases without negatively
aecting tax proceeds. The reduction in the amount of collected taxes from consu-
mers is less substantial than the increase in tax proceeds deriving from the reduc-
tion in the evasion of the tax on prots. The itemised deduction that maximises
tax proceeds is always strictly positive, which means that, ceteris paribus, introdu-
cing deductions implies: a) that the public budget constraint is relaxed (higher tax
proceeds and/or lower tax rates) and b) that the size of the underground market
shrinks.
Section 2 presents the framework of the model. I solve the model in section 3
and nd the optimal level of deduction. Section 4 analyses the results and provides
a numerical example. The last section concludes.
6France and the Scandinavian countries are an exception, with deductions ranging between
25% and 30%.
7From a practical perspective, such a mechanism may, in the past, would have incurred
signicant implementation costs. Nowadays, it would be sucient to provide to consumers
a magnetic card using the same technology as credit cards, that would register the value of
transactions.
8A similar idea has been used in France over the last decades: the government partially
subsidises the rent of the poorest citizens through the \Aide au Logement". Landlords are
forced to declare their renting income or to reduce the rent by the value of the subsidy.
22 The model
I describe here the main elements of the model: I start (subsection 2.1) by des-
cribing the goods in the economy and the agents' behaviour. Then I analyse the
organisation of the market and the rms' behaviour (subsection 2.2). Finally I
present the problem of the central authority (politician/social planner) (subsec-
tion 2.3).
2.1 The agents
A representative consumer can choose between the numeraire good M and a
consumption good, available both legally (X) and illegally (Y): x and y denote
the quantity of good exchanged on the legal and on the black market respectively
at prices p and q.
For a consumer, X and Y are versions of a same good. It is natural to assume
(in terms of the utility function) that the two goods are substitute. The degree of
substitutability may range from perfect subsitutability (e.g., a stolen, brand new,
music CD) to very low substitutability (e.g., a plagiarised version of a software).
Regardless of the possible dierences between the two versions of the good, a
consumer may have a preference for legal purchases over the illegal ones. For that
reason, I introduce a parameter in the utility function allowing to consider for the
aversion towards illegality. The parameter accounts for the depreciation, in terms
of utility, of a good that is sold on the black market, compared to the same good
sold on the legal market.
I assume that the representative consumer has the standard quasi-linear utility
function (U) leading to the linear demand function for imperfect substitute goods
that is common in the I.O. literature.9 I impose no restrictions on the (positive)
quantities x and y that can be consumed, as far as the consumer's budget constraint
is satised.
U(x;y;M) = (x   x
2) + (y   y
2)   2xy + M (1)
where  2 [0;1] is the degree of substitutability between X and Y , and  2 [0;1]
is the aversion-towards-illegality parameter. When  = 1, the consumer has no
prejudice against the illegal good.10
9Boone and Pottersz (2006) analyse the properties of this utility function for the case of n
dierent goods.
10While  depends on the real characteristics of the goods,  is the type of the consu-
mer/society: the larger , the more people are likely to accept to break the law. Note that
for  = 1 and  = 1, the utility function boils down to the case of perfect substitute goods. For
the other values of the parameter, the goods remain substitutes (i.e., the partial derivative of the
demand of one good with respect to the consumption of the other good is negative), although
not perfect.
3The consumer's income I is exogenous, and t is the rate of the tax levied on it.
An itemised deduction is a reduction in the tax base granted when the legal good
is purchased. The deduction is per-unit (opposed to per-value), this has the nice
property of avoiding unnecessary ination. A deduction of amount a is granted
for any purchased unit exceeding the threshold x0. The (exogenous) threshold x0
is meant to reduce the cost for the government of implementing this policy, a too
high threshold would decrease the attractiveness of the deductions, while a too low
one would imply a larger opportunity cost of implementing the policy. It would
be very interesting, but beyond the scope of this work, to compute the optimal
level of the threshold. In my work, I assume that the threshold used is equal to
the number of units that are purchased when itemised deductions are not allowed.




s:t: px + qy + M  I   t(I   a(x   x0))
From the rst order conditions, we derive the inverse demand function respec-
tively for X and Y :
p(x;y) = 1   2x   2y + ta (3)
and
q(x;y) =    2y   2x (4)
2.2 The market
The organisation of the industry heavily depends on the type of good that we
consider. The common factor is that we have two sub-markets, one for the legal
and one for the illegal good. The simplest market that we can imagine is a duopoly,
with one rm operating in each sub-market. This structure can apply, for example,
to the case of a regulated legal market or of a legal monopoly (as, for instance,
in the case of cigarettes or of a product protected by a patent), in presence of
an illegal cartel. In that case, one single agent is choosing the quantity and price
on the legal market (the regulator) and one on the black market (the cartel). It
seems reasonable to consider that the legal rm sets its own quantity and price,
anticipating the behaviour of the illegal rm. For that reason, the natural way to
model this framework is the Stackelberg competition with the legal rm acting as
the leader.
For expositional convenience, I restrain my attention, in the core of the paper,
to the Stackelberg duopoly case, that seems to me the best compromise between
simplicity of the model and realism. The reader should not think that results
4are driven by this assumption, results hold (qualitatively) for a much larger set
of market congurations: in the appendix I solve the problem for the case of
Cournot competition, with n rms operating on the legal market and m rms on
the underground market.
X and Y are produced by two independent rms competing  a la Stackelberg
and facing the same marginal cost of production c. The legal rm is the leader
and chooses the quantity rst, and the illegal one follows. By denition, only the
legal rm pays the tax T on its prots. The maximisation problem of the follower,
given the inverse demand function q(x;y), is
max
y (q(x;y)   c)y (5)
s:t: q(x;y) =    2y   2x
from which we obtain the follower's reaction function
y =
   2x   c
4
(6)
The Stackelberg leader maximisation problem is therefore:
max
x (1   T)(p(x;y)   c)x (7)
s:t: p(x;y) = 1   2x   2y + ta
y =
   2x   c
4
2.3 The government
The government is concerned by total tax proceeds (TP), which are given by the
sum of consumers' income tax proceeds and rms' prots tax proceeds, and which
are equal to
TP(a) = T(p(x;y)   c)x + t(I   a(x   x0) (8)
The focus of this research is on itemised deductions. I assume that both tax
rates are exogenous (that is, the government has already chosen the optimal rates)
and I focus on the optimal level of deduction. The government only controls the
reduction in the tax base (i.e., the level of a) to which the representative consumer
is entitled for each unit of x purchased above the threshold x0 .
The optimal level of deduction is dened, according to this maximisation pro-
blem, as the one that maximises tax proceeds. Clearly, the objective function of
the social planner/politician may be dierent, ranging from minimising the size of
the underground market to the reduction of the tax rate for some agents in the
5economy. These questions are beyond the scope of this work, but the model can
be easily adapted to dierent objective functions.
3 Market equilibrium and optimal deduction
In this section, I compute the market equilibrium, nding the optimal quantities
and prices both for the legal and illegal rm. Afterwards, I compute the optimal
level of deduction a.
Solving equation (7), from the rst order condition we obtain that
x
(a) =






Replacing x in equation (6), we obtain that
y
(a) =






and nally, using (9) and (10) we can also compute prices:
p
(a) =














We restrict our attention to the case of
c <
(4   2   2)
(4   2   2)
; (13)
which is a necessary and sucient condition for the underground market to be
active when deductions are not allowed (i.e., a = 0 and y(0) > 0).11 For condition
(13) not to require a negative marginal cost we also need to assume that
 > : (14)
Conditions (13) and (14) are sucient to ensure that both prices and quantities
are positive in equilibrium and that both the consumer's and the rms' problems
are strictly concave. 12
11If equation 13 does not hold, then already before the introduction of the itemised deduction
there is no evasion, and therefore no need for the deduction.
12By the strict concavity of the problem, the previously shown results (derived from the rst
order conditions) represent the unique maxima of the corresponding maximisation problems.
6Proposition 1 The equilibrium quantities x(a) and y(a) are respectively dened
by equations (9) and (10), and the corresponding prices are p(a) and q(a), as
dened by equations (11) and (12).
Proposition 2 The legally purchased quantity and its price (x(a) and p(a)) are
both increasing in the level of deduction a; the reverse is true for the quantity
bought illegally and for its price (y(a) and q(a)), which are decreasing in a.
Proof. It is straightforward to check the sign of the derivatives of equations (9)
to (12) with respect to a.
Using the previous results, we can solve the government problem, consisting in
nding, for an exogenous level of taxation, the itemised deduction a that maximises
tax proceeds TP(a).
max
a T(p(a)   c)x + t(I   a(x   x0)) (15)
s:t: x = x
(a)
From the rst order condition of the problem, we obtain that the optimal level
of itemised deduction is:
a
 =
T((2   )   c(2   ))
2t(2   T)
(16)
Under the previous assumptions (13) and (14), the problem is strictly concave and
a is always positive.
Proposition 3 Equation (16) denes the optimal level of the per-unit itemised de-
duction a when the government's aim is to maximise tax proceeds for a given level
of tax rates. The value a is always positive, meaning that it is always benecial
to allow for the deduction.
3.1 Comparative statics
For its policy implications, a policy maker may be also interested in the eect of
the dierent parameters on the optimal value a. This subsection briey analyses
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From the previous derivatives, we observe that the optimal deduction increases
in the tax rate on prots: for a larger T, reducing the size of the underground
market becomes more protable, and the public authority accepts larger losses on
the consumer side. The opposite reasoning applies for a larger income tax rate:
the larger t, the more costly is to implement a deduction policy.
Whenever the legal rm's prots decrease, it becomes less protable to intro-
duce deductions, therefore the optimal value for a decreases. Both  and c reduce
the prots of the legal rm. The marginal cost of production, c, has a direct eect
on prots. A change in the aversion to buy on the illegal market () modies the
marginal rate of substitution between X and Y . When  increases, X is replaced
by Y and the legal rm's prots decrease. Hence, both an increase in  and in c
induce a reduction in the optimal value of a.
Also an increase in  implies a reduction in the value of a. A larger value of
 means that X and Y are better substitutes. Consumers replace Y by X more
easily, deductions are more eective and a smaller a is enough to obtain an increase
in the consumption of the legal good.
3.2 Deductions and auditing
Readers certainly noticed that I do not explicitly consider the possibility of de-
terring evasion through auditing and ning, a diused technique that has been
largely studied in the theoretical, empirical and experimental literature.
Fining and auditing is a costly but eective way of reducing evasion and it
should be used together with itemised deductions. I implicitly assumed that,
given costs of auditing and limited liability, the government was already choosing
the pair auditing-ne that maximises tax proceeds. The ne aects the nal
expected prot of the illegal rm, but (unless it determines the exit of the rm
from the market) it does not aect the decision about quantities and prices. In
this subsection, I study the main interaction between auditing and the optimal
8deduction.
Taking into account auditing (and ning), the maximisation problem of the
underground rm (equation (5)) becomes
max
y   F + (1   T)(q(x;y)   c)y (22)
s:t: q(x;y) =    2y   2x
where  is the probability of being audited and F is the ne that the rm should
pay when audited. The value of  is aecting prots but not the reaction function,
which remains the same as in equation (6).
Denote by () the cost of auditing, assumed to be increasing and convex; the
maximisation problem of the government becomes
max
a; T(p(a)   c)x + t(I   a(x   x0)) + (F + T(q(a)   c)y)   () (23)








T(p(0)   c)x + tI + (F + T(q(0)   c)y)   () (24)




Using equation (24), the derivative with respect to  denes the optimal level
of audit when deductions are not allowed (0), which is








 1(F + T(q(0)   c)y0) (26)
From q(a) and y(a) being decreasing functions of a, it follows that  is also de-
creasing in a. The optimal audit level is the one that equates the expected benets
(i.e., the increase in tax proceeds) to its cost. When introducing deductions, the
size of the underground market shrinks, making it less protable to audit. When
9the expected benets are reduced, the optimal audit level decreases.
Analogously, starting from when audits are not performed ( = 0), the level
of deduction decreases if the government introduces audit. The optimal deduction
equalises the increase in tax proceeds on the rm side with the losses generated
by the deduction on the consumer side. An extra loss appears in the presence




Proposition 4 Both itemised deductions and audit are instruments to reduce tax
evasion. A crowding out eect exists among the two, but it does not imply that the
two measures are incompatible. An increase in deductions reduces the protability
of audits, and vice versa. If the audit cost function is continuous and well behaved,
(absent x costs of audit) both the optimal levels  and a are positive.
4 Analysis of the results
I derived the equilibrium prices and quantities for a consumption good that is sold
both on the legal and the underground market, under the assumption that the
rm operating on the legal market and the one on the black market compete  a la
Stackelberg, with the legal rm representing the leader.13 Consumers perceive the
two goods as substitutes (with  as a parameter of how substitute the two goods
are) and may have an aversion to illegality () implying that, ceteris paribus, a
consumer prefers to buy the good legally.
Imposing a condition on c,  and  that ensures some tax evasion, I derived the
optimal value for a, which is a per-unit itemised deduction that allows consumers to
reduce their tax base for any purchased unit of the legal good above an exogenous
threshold.
The deduction is independent of prices, otherwise we would observe an unne-
cessary articial increase in the price p (ination). The itemised deduction is a
cost for the government (the tax proceeds collected from consumers decrease), but
the consumption of legal good increases, generating extra proceeds from the tax
T. This second eect osets the previous one as long as a  a.
The optimal value a is positive for any combination of the parameters: for the
government it is always benecial (in terms of tax proceeds) to allow for itemised
deductions. Furthermore, a induces a prots reduction for the underground rm.
It is likely that prots from the underground economy are invested in illegal acti-
vities, therefore itemised deductions can also be used to ght illegal activities in
the country. Depending on the social welfare function, therefore, the government
13In the appendix, I show the results for the Cournot case, which are qualitatively analogous.
10may prefer a larger than optimal level of deduction (representing a loss in terms
of tax proceeds but inducing a reduction in crime).
Tables 1 and 2 propose numerical examples of the results of the model, for the
case of t = T = 0:3, and c = 0:2. In table 1,  = 1 and  = 0:9, while  = 0:7 and
 = 0:5 in table 2.14 Notice that, as the deduction applies only to units purchased
above the threshold x0, the consumer price on the legal market cannot be obtained
simply by the dierence between the market price p and the deduction.
a = 0 a = a = 0:259 a = 2:059
p 0.42 0.459 0.729
q 0.434 0.404 -
x 0.185 0.217 0.444
y 0.117 0.102 0
TP 0.3I+0.012 0.3I+0.014 0.3I-0.09
Table 1: Numerical example 1.
a = 0 a = a = 0:365 a = 3:405
p 0.511 0.566 1.02
q 0.355 0.339 -
x 0.189 0.223 0.5
y 0.111 0.099 0
TP 0.3I+0.018 0.3I+0.021 0.3I-0.194
Table 2: Numerical example 2.
The rst column represents the market equilibrium when deductions are not
allowed; the middle one is for the optimal level of deductions. When a = a,
the size of the underground economy shrinks, but it does not disappear. The
right column corresponds o a level of deduction large enough for the underground
market to disappear. The bottom row (i.e., TP) represents tax proceeds. You can
notice that the largest TP is attained when a = a.
5 Conclusions
This study investigates the eectiveness of itemised deductions as a device to
reduce tax evasion, when both sides of the market (sellers and consumers) pay
some taxes (possibly with dierent rates).
Consumers use their income to buy a good on the legal or underground market
(or both), to consume the numeraire good and to pay a tax on their exogenous
income. The legal and underground rms compete on quantities, the legal rm
14Values are cut after the 3rd decimal.
11pays a tax on prot. Treating the tax rates as exogenous, the government chooses
the level of itemised deductions maximising tax proceeds.
I show that the optimal level of deductions is always positive, meaning that
it is always benecial to allow for deductions in a market characterised by tax
evasion. Part of the eect of deductions is oset by the use of nes and audit to
discourage evasion. The cost of auditing and limited liability nevertheless make
nes an imperfect instrument, itemised deductions should not be considered as a
substitute of auditing systems but rather as a complement. The cost of deductions
consists in the drop in tax proceeds from consumers, but I show that this is more
than compensated by a fall in tax evasion of rms and by the subsequent increase
in tax proceeds.
Although I do not study welfare implications in my model, it is clear that the
reduction in tax evasion does not represent an increase in eciency but only a
dierent redistribution of welfare (from the underground rm to the government,
that will use it either to provide more public goods or to reduce tax rates). Cer-
tainly we do not observe a Pareto improvement, depending on the social welfare
function, we can expect an increase in welfare deriving from a better arbitrage
amongst marginal utilities of money for the rm and consumers.
Provided that prots on the black market are likely to be used for nancing
illegal activities, if the social welfare function includes the crimes rate in the coun-
try, or the country's reputation on the international ground, the optimal level of
deduction would be above the one that maximises tax proceeds. Using this mo-
del results, it would be interesting to study the consequences on the underground
economy of a long term policy of deductions above the optimal level.
Another possible extension of this model would be to consider the implications
in terms of optimal behaviour for a politician. In particular, depending on how
prots from the underground rm are used and/or distributed among shareholders,
would it be in the interest of a politician aiming to be elected to propose such a
policy?
Finally, this model can be applied to a labour supply-demand model; in order
to determine the conditions under which a reduction in the taxes on the labour
force would push rms to legally hire their employees (forcing them to declare their
income). In particular, it would be interesting to consider a more complex general
equilibrium model, in which agents income is endogenous and an analogous scheme
is used to convince workers to declare their income.
12Appendix
A The Cournot case
I solve here the model for the case of Cournot competition, with n legal and m
illegal rms being active on the market. The optimal value a is quantitatively
dierent, but it remains positive; all the previous results hold under Cournot
competition.
Each legal rm produces a quantity xi, with i 2 [1;n]; the total quantity is
then x =
Pn
1 xi. The rms on the underground market produce a quantity yj,
with j 2 [1;m]. The maximisation problem of the a legal rm is
max
xi
(1   T)(p(x;y)   c)xi (27)
s:t: p(x;y) = 1   2x   2y + ta
while rms on the underground market face the following maximisation problem:
max
yj
(q(x;y)   c)yj (28)
s:t: q(x;y) =    2x   2y
The two corresponding rst order conditions are respectively








Assuming that rms are symmetric, and that therefore xi = xh for any i;h 2
[0;n], and that yj = yk for any j;k 2 [0;m], we have that
P
h6=i xh = (n 1)xi and
P
k6=j yk = (m   1)yj.





(m + 1)(1   c)   m(   c)
2((m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2)
+
(m + 1)





(n + 1)(   c)   n(1   c)
2((m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2)
 
n
2((m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2)
ta (32)
13and the Cournot prices
p
c(a) =
[1 + m(1   )] + c[mn(   2) + n + m]
(m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2 +
(m + 1)




[n(   ) + ] + c[mn(   2) + (m + n)]
(m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2  
n
(m + 1)(n + 1)   mn2ta
(34)
For the Cournot case with many rms, the assumptions that guarantee the
presence of tax evasion when deductions are not available become
c <
n(   ) + 







The assumption that    is still sucient for all the maximisation problems
to be concave and the results (quantities and prices) to be always positive.
Remembering that the aggregate legal quantity xc(a) is dened as xc(a) =
nxc




































Solving the problem, we obtain the optimal level of deduction ac, which is now












It is easy to check that ac is always positive: (pc
0 c) > 0 is a necessary condition
to have a market in the case of no deduction, and (1   pc
1T) is always positive.
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